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Abstract
Recently, a significant amount of interest has been developed in motivating physicians to use e-health technology (especially
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) systems). An important utility of such EMR systems is: a next generation of Clinical Decision
Support Systems (CDSS) will extract knowledge from these electronic medical records to enable physicians to do accurate and
effective diagnosis. It is anticipated that in future such medical records will be shared through cloud among different physicians
to improve the quality of health care. Therefore, right protection of medical records is important to protect their ownership once
they are shared with third parties. Watermarking is a proven well known technique to achieve this objective. The challenges
associated with watermarking of EMR systems are: (1) some fields in EMR are more relevant in the diagnosis process; as a
result, small variations in them could change the diagnosis, and (2) a misdiagnosis might not only result in a life threatening
scenario but also might lead to significant costs of the treatment for the patients. The major contribution of this paper is an
information-preserving watermarking scheme to address the above-mentioned challenges. We model the watermarking process
as a constrained optimization problem. We demonstrate, through experiments, that our scheme not only preserves the diagnosis
accuracy but is also resilient to well known attacks for corrupting the watermark. Last but not least, we also compare our scheme
with a well known threshold-based scheme to evaluate relative merits of a classifier. Our pilot studies reveal that – using proposed
information-preserving scheme – the overall classification accuracy is never degraded by more than 1%. In comparison, the
diagnosis accuracy, using the threshold-based technique, is degraded by more than 18% in a worst case scenario.
Index Terms
Right protection, EMR, watermarking, decision support systems, optimization problems, particle swarm optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
PERVASIVE and ubiquitous deployment of information and communication technology infrastructure is bringing a revo-lution the way health care services are provided. Consequently, e-health technology and its associated systems are being
actively standardized, adopted and deployed. An important component of modern e-health technology is EMR systems in which
a patient’s medical history, his vitals, lab tests, and diagnostic images are stored [1]. In the health reform package, Obama
administration is offering between $44,000 and $64,000 to the physicians who would use EMR systems. The incentive amount
for adopting EMR systems at a hospital is $11 million [2].
In order to provide quality care, it is relevant that the access to medical records be provided in a ubiquitous fashion to the
concerned physicians. Therefore, the inter-operable EMR systems are becoming the top priority in the US [3]. This demands
exchanging and sharing sensitive health records in a network cloud. Moreover, next generation of CDSSs will have the ability
to extract knowledge from the electronic medical records and use them to assist physicians in making accurate and effective
diagnosis. In such scenarios, the shared data might be illegally sold to third parties by an unauthorized party. In order to cater
for such a situation, the data needs to be right protected so that an unauthorized party might be sued in a court of law. This
is only possible, if the data owner is able to prove that the illegally sold data is his property. Therefore, it is important to
not only protect the privacy of the patients [4], [5], [6] but also the ownership (copyright) of the medical data shared with
collaborative partners or third party vendors. In a recent survey, it is reported that frauds related to stolen medical records have
risen from 3% in 2008 to 7% in 2009 (approximately a 112% increase) [7]. Similarly, confidential medical records of patients
in the EMR of a prestigious private hospital in UK were illegally sold to undercover investigators for 4£ per record [8]. It is
stated that theft of medical records is more serious because it takes more than twice the time to detect a fraud related to the
medical information and the average cost is $12,100 which is more than twice the cost for other types of data theft [9]. A
recent case related to an illegal sale of the medical data is reported in [10]. Therefore, it is important that medical records be
right protected in a manner where ownership could unambiguously be determined. (The data theft is becoming a serious issue
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3even for the most reliable brands like LexisNexis, Polo Ralph Lauren, HSBC, NCR, and a number of renowned universities
[11]).
In this paper, we propose a novel right protection scheme that will establish the ownership of EMR data, and consequently,
will make its illegal sale very difficult (even if the intruder has altered the original data). Recently, some watermarking
techniques are proposed for databases [12], [13], [14] but they are unable to address a significant challenge related to EMR:
insertion of a watermark must not result in changing health and medical history of a patient to a level where a decision maker
(or system) can misdiagnose the patient. If a patient is misdiagnosed, it might not only put his life on risk but also result
in significantly enhancing the cost of health care. In order to address this problem, we propose the concept of information-
preserving watermarking. The basic motivation behind this technique is to first develop a model that determines the correlation
of different features with the diagnosis. We model the process of computing a suitable watermark as a constrained optimization
problem [15]. Once the watermark is computed, it is inserted (with O(n) complexity) by utilizing the knowledge of correlation
of those features that have negligible impact on the diagnosis. As a result, the diagnosis rules are preserved and it is important
because these rules are used for diagnosing the patients and suggesting a relevant treatment plan. Consequently, if a rule is
changed due to insertion of watermark then the suggested treatment would also change which may cause serious harm to the
life of a patient. Moreover, wrong treatment will also waste time and money of the patients. Therefore, it is mandatory that
during watermarking of EMR, diagnosis rules must be preserved. Moreover, the inserted watermark should be imperceptible
to intruders and they should not be able to corrupt it by launching malicious attacks [15], [16]. Last but not least, multiple
insertions of the same watermark should not corrupt medical records.
Recent research proves that computational intelligence techniques, especially Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [17], [18],
are ideally suited for solving constrained optimization problems in realtime. In this paper, we use PSO to create an optimized
watermark that – once inserted into an EMR – does not alter the diagnosis rules. The major contributions of our work are: (1)
an intelligent information-preserving watermarking technique for EMR systems that ensures data usability constraints and also
preserves the rules after the watermark encoding, (2) realtime insertion of watermark into an EMR system, and (3) a robust
watermark decoding scheme that is resilient against all kinds of malicious attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the research related to
our work by emphasizing the different direction of our work. In section III, we discuss our proposed scheme followed by
experiments and results in section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper with an outlook to our future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Agrawal et al. [15] proposed the idea of watermarking using least significant bits (LSB). They do not account for multibit
watermarks which makes their technique vulnerable against simple attacks, for example shifting of only one least significant
bit results in loss of watermark. Xinchun et al. have proposed a watermarking scheme for relational databases that uses weights
(assigned by users) of attributes to identify the location where the watermark is to be inserted [19]. They intuitively argue
that the primary key of a database is the most important attribute and hence a watermark should not be inserted in it. They,
however, did not consider the importance of ranking attributes because their focus was not on using a database for data mining
and decision support systems.
Sion et al. [13] presented a watermarking scheme in which data is partitioned using marker tuples. But if an attacker
launches an attack on marker tuples, the synchronization is lost. The marker tuples decide the boundaries for the partitions but
successful insertion or deletion attacks on marker tuples would result in synchronization errors. Li et al. [20] have proposed
a watermarking technique to detect and localize alterations made to a database relation with relevant attributes. Li et al. have
proposed a technique for fingerprinting relational data [21] by extending the technique proposed in [15]. Jiang et al. proposed
an invisible watermarking technique using Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) in [22].
A well known problem with all these techniques is: they are not resilient to malicious attacks launched by an intruder.
Recently, Shehab et al. have proposed a robust watermarking scheme in [14]. They model a bit encoding algorithm as an
optimization problem and use Genetic Algorithm (GA) [23] and Pattern Search (PS) [24] to do the optimization. They use a
threshold based approach coupled with a majority vote to decode the watermark. The focus of their work is to show that their
scheme is robust to malicious attacks (insertion and deletion) launched by an intruder. In [25] Bertino et al. have proposed a
technique for preserving the ownership of outsourced medical data but they their focus was on preserving the classification
potential and the diagnostic rules.
In comparison, the focus of our work is to rank attributes (features) on the basis of their importance in a decision making
process. Our objective is to identify weak attributes by developing a knowledge model that correlates the effect of an attribute
on the decision making process. The major difference of our approach from previous techniques is that we first identify the
classification potential of each attribute for a given diagnosis. Furthermore, we use the knowledge of classification potential
for every candidate attribute to calculate the watermark which ensures that the data usability constraints remain intact and also
the diagnosis rules are preserved. As a result, we meet the most important requirement while right protecting an EMR: to
preserve the diagnostic semantics of the health record of a patient (i.e. a patient should not be misdiagnosed).
The proposed technique uses an optimization technique to first create a watermark which ensures that data usability
constraints are not violated. Once the watermark is created, we embed it in realtime into an EMR system. In comparison, other
4techniques [14] use optimization techniques during watermark embedding and hence they take a significant amount of time.
As a consequence, they are not suitable for realtime insertion of watermark into an EMR system.
Moreover, our technique is also robust to malicious attacks because it does not target any specific group of tuples 1 for
watermarking (almost all other techniques developed so far use a secret key to select some group of tuples as candidate
attribute(s) for watermarking).
III. THE PROPOSED INFORMATION-PRESERVING WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE
We propose a framework that does information-preserving right protection of EMR systems (see Figure 1). The framework
operates in two modes: (1) Watermark encoding, and (2) Watermark decoding. In the watermark encoding phase, the objective
is to determine a watermark that, once inserted into an EMR2, does not alter the vital features to an extent that the patient
is misdiagnosed. Similarly, the objective of the decoding phase is to accurately detect a watermark in an efficient manner. We
now discuss the watermark encoding scheme in the following.
Fig. 1. The architecture of the proposed scheme.
A. Watermark Encoding Phase
In this phase (or mode), three important steps are to be performed: (1) quantifying the importance of a patient’s vitals (or
history information) and their correlation with the diagnosis, (2) computing a set of possible values to calculate the watermark
and then selecting the optimum one with the help of an optimization scheme, and (3) embedding the information-preserving
optimum watermark into EMR fields for right protection.
For a quick reference, Table I lists the notations used in this paper. (We recommend that a reader should refer to this table
whenever he/she is in doubt about the interpretation of an encountered symbol.)
It is worth mentioning here that – for brevity – in our pilot studies, the reported results are on a Gynaecological database
collected by the authors of [26] from different tertiary care hospitals. But our technique is not dependent on any particular
disease or any particular feature vector. Our technique takes the features’ set of any particular disease and calculates the
classification potential of all the features for classifying that disease as depicted in section III-A1. Since the classification
potential of every feature, in the database of any disease, can be calculated using equation (4); therefore, our technique works
for every disease with any set of features’ vector.
1Throughout this text – unless otherwise specified – we use the terms tuples, rows and records to refer to rows in EMR.
2Throughout this text – unless otherwise specified – we use the terms database, dataset and EMR to refer to the EMR.
5Fig. 2. Effect of inserting a watermark, using techniques that do not preserve information, in attributes with different CP on various classification statistics
for diagnosing hypertension in the hypertension dataset. (a) Change in TP(%) when only one attribute with the highest CP is watermarked. (b) Change in
TP(%) when only one attribute with the lowest CP is watermarked. (c) Change in FP(%) when only one attribute with the highest CP is watermarked. (d)
Change in FP(%) when only one attribute with the lowest CP is watermarked.
1) Ranking Features for Accurate Medical Diagnosis: In order to rank features, we assign each feature in the feature vector
a value – classification potential (CP ) – that reflects the importance of the feature in the diagnosis. The classification potential
(CP ) is then used to select features (or attributes) that are to be watermarked. We rank features to avoid a situation when a
change in a feature will not only alter its (CP ) but also overall classification statistics (CS)3 of the diagnosis. These statistics
are the building blocks of the diagnosis rules; therefore, these statistics must be preserved for preserving the diagnosis rules.
As a consequence, it is relevant to put the watermark in those features that satisfy the following equation:
CPW − CPO = 0 (1)
where CPO and CPW represent the classification potential of a feature before and after insertion of a watermark respectively.
In order to do information-preserving watermarking, we need to apply an optimization technique so that the above-mentioned
constraint is satisfied (the change in the value of high ranking features are approximately zero). As a result, we preserve the
classification potential (CP ) and hence implicitly the overall classification statistics (CS). For ranking the features we use a
statistical parameter – information gain [27]. The information gain, IG for an attribute a may be calculated as:
IG(R, a) = H(R)−
∑
j
P (a = vj)H(R|a = vj) (2)
3Classification statistics include TP, FP, TN, FN, DR(%), and FAR(%) with FAR = FP
FP+TN
and DR = TP
TP+FN
.
6TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THE PAPER.
Symbol Description Symbol Description
EMR Original database b The watermark bit
EMRW Watermarked database µ The mean of an attribute
R Total number of rows in a table (or dataset) r A row in the database table
F The features set present in a table (or dataset) σ The standard deviation of an attribute a
TP The number of positive instances correctly detected min(a) The minimum value of an attribute a
as positive
FP The number of negative instances incorrectly detected % The change in the value of an attribute in EMRW
as positive after an attack
TN The number of negative instances correctly detected max(a) The maximum value of an attribute a
as negative
FN The number of positive instances incorrectly detected C The cardinality of f
as negative
CP Classification potential of a feature in the database ~ Usability constraints matrix
∆CP Change in classification potential of a feature in the ηfc The exact value of watermark for a feature fc
database after changing its value row of the database relation
CS Overall classification statistics of the database ∆ A matrix containing secret parameters
CPO The classification potential of a feature in EMR τ The watermark decoder used for watermark decoding
CPW The classification potential of a feature in EMRW γ A correction factor to adjust value of τ
a An attribute or column in the original database (EMR) EMR
′
W A watermarked database after the malicious attacks
xa The value of an attribute a l The length of the watermark
IG(R, a) The information gain of an attribute a in the database ηdfc Detected amount of change in the value of a feature after
an attack on the watermark bit b
H(R) The entropy of R rows η∆fc The difference between the changes detected in the value
of a feature during the encoding and decoding process
P The probability of a certain event W Embedded watermark
fcW The watermarked candidate feature fc WD Decoded watermark
A Total number of attributes in the database EMRWP EMR watermarked by the proposed scheme
m The number of features selected for watermarking EMRWs EMR watermarked by Shehab’s scheme
βfc(min) Lower bound (percentage) for the watermark value for ∆P The percentage difference between classification statistics
the feature fc when classifying EMR and EMRWP
βfc(max) Upper bound (percentage) for the watermark value for ∆S The percentage difference between classification statistics
the feature fc when classifying EMR and EMRWS
β An optimized value (percentage) of watermark for the DR The percentage of positive instances correctly classified
feature fc as TP
Vmin The normalized minimum value of an attribute in the database FAR The percentage of negative instances incorrectly classified as TP
Vmax The normalized maximum value of an attribute in the database CP (BW ) The classification potential of a particular feature before
watermarking
f The feature(s) set selected for watermarking CP (AWP ) The classification potential of a particular feature after
watermarking with our scheme
fc A candidate feature to be watermarked CP (AWS) The classification potential of a particular feature after
watermarking with the Shehab’s scheme
p The number of particles in the swarm ∆CPS The difference in percentage between CP (AWS) and
CP (BW )
g The maximum number of iterations for PSO ∆CPP The difference in percentage between CP (AWP ) and
CP (BW )
with
H(R) = −
∑
jR
P (a = vj)log2P (a = vj), (3)
Where R is the total number of rows in the table (or dataset), H(R) is the entropy of R rows, P represents the probability,
and vj is the value of an attribute a. The classification potential of an attribute a is calculated using the following equation:
CPa =
(
IG(a)∑A
n=1 IG(n)
)
∗ 100 (4)
Where A is the total number of attributes present in the EMR. In order to prove our thesis that information-insensitive (does
not care about feature ranking) watermarking negatively effects the classification accuracy, an empirical study is designed. In
this pilot study, we first sort the features on the basis of their information gain. We then pick a feature from the top and the
bottom of the rank. We arbitrarily change the values of the selected feature by inserting watermark and then analyze its impact
on the classification accuracy of well known classifiers (carefully chosen from different learning paradigms): NaiveBayes, RBF
Network, Bagging and J48. The outcome of the empirical study is depicted in Figure 2. Note that we ensure that the value of
the features are never changed by more than 5% after inserting the watermark. Moreover, it is ensured that usability constraints
are also satisfied.
It is evident from Figure 2 that when only one top ranking feature is altered, the accuracies of classifiers are significantly
degraded (especially NB and RBF). Hence it proves our thesis: In EMR, it is a must to do information-preserving watermarking
to reduce the rate of misdiagnosis. To conclude, after this step, we have identified top ranking features in our features’ vector.
7The next step is to calculate the range of a watermark that does not significantly alter the classification potential of each
feature.
2) Watermark Range Calculation: We now need to develop a model for the range of values of (to be constructed) watermark
as a function of the classification potential (CP ) of the features.
Recall that the diagnosis rules are sensitive to the features with a high classification potential. Therefore, a small change in
high ranking features is not acceptable because it deteriorates the overall classification statistics CS . To cater for this situation,
we calculate the lower (βfc(max)) and upper bound (βfc(min)) of the watermark as a function of CP , Vmin and Vmax using
equations (5) and (6) respectively for every selected feature fc in the feature set F . We have empirically determined (See Figure
2) that inverse relationship exists between the classification potential of a feature and the amount of change it can tolerate,
leading us to equations (5) and (6). According to these two equations, the attributes having greater classification potential
should be altered less to preserve the classification statistics after the watermarking. In equations (5) and (6), 1 is added to
the denominator to avoid exceptions of infinity. The second term in equations (5) and (6) normalizes the values of (βfc(max))
and (βfc(min)), where Vmin and Vmax are the normalized minimum and maximum values of a candidate attribute fc, in the
range (0,1).
βfc(min) =
(
1
1 + CP
)
∗
(
Vmin
Vmax + 1
)
(5)
βfc(max) =
(
1
1 + CP
)
∗
(
Vmax
Vmin + 1
)
(6)
B. Watermark Creation
1) Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm: Particle swarm optimization (PSO) [28] is a population based stochastic algo-
rithm developed for continuous optimization. The inspiration for PSO has come from the social behavior of flocking birds. In
PSO, each particle of a swarm represents a potential solution. Each particle has its own set of attributes including position,
velocity and a fitness value which is obtained by evaluating a fitness function at its current position. The objective of particles
is to search for a global optimum. The algorithm starts with the initialization of particles with random positions and velocities
so that they can move in the solution space. Then these particles search the solution space for finding better solutions. Each
particle keeps track of its personal best position found so far by storing the coordinates in the solution space. The best position
found so far by any particle during any stage of the algorithm is also stored and is termed as the global best position. The
velocity of every particle is influenced by its personal best position (autobiographical memory) and the global best position
(publicized knowledge). The new position for every particle is calculated by adding its new velocity value to every component
of its position vector. The velocity υi of particle i is updated using the equation (7) as follows:
υij(t+ 1) = υij(t) + c1 ∗ r1j(t) ∗ (yij(t)− xij(t))
+ c2 ∗ r2j(t) ∗
(
ygj (t)− xij(t)
) (7)
where j is the index of the dimension of the problem, t indicates a (unit) pseudo-time increment, c1 and c2 are positive
acceleration constants, r1j and r2j are random values in the range [0, 1], yij is the personal best position of element i, xij is
the current position of the element i, and ygij is the best position found by any particle of the swarm. The position xi of the
particle i at any time interval t is added to its new velocity component to update its position using the equation:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + υi(t+ 1) (8)
2) Watermark Creation Algorithm: We formulate the watermark creation process as a constrained optimization problem.
The objective function is formulated using equation (9) as follows:
∀fc, fcf, maxβfc
subject to
1. βfc(min) ≤ βfc ≤ βfc(max)
2. CPW = CPO;
3.
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2 (
xa−µ
σ )
2
=
1
σW
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
xaW
−µW
σW
)2
;
4. min(a) = min(aW );
5. max(a) = max(aW );
(9)
Where xa represent the value of an attribute a in the dataset (EMR) and xaW is the value of an attribute aW in the dataset
(EMRW ), µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the attribute a of dataset, and µW and σW are the mean and standard
8Algorithm 1 WatermarkCreation
Input: EMR, f , Usability Constraints set ~
Output: Betamatrix {β1, β2, ....., βC}
Initialize swarm SW of p particles with positions and velocities in the range (βmin, βmax) and 0 ≤ υi(0) ≤ υmax(0) respectively
for every feature in the f perform the following steps
for iter = 1 to itermax do
for i = 1 to p do
note personal best and local best positions
Use swarm to calculate watermark to insert in f subject to ~
Evaluate the fitness of particle i using equation (9)
if stopping condition has met then
return {β1, β2, ....., βC}
else
Update personal best and global best positions
end if
end for
end for
return {β1, β2, ....., βC}
deviation of the attribute aW in the watermarked dataset. The classification potentials – CPO and CPW – are calculated using
equation 4. (Generally speaking, all usability constraints should be satisfied during the process of watermarking.) The motivation
of above-mentioned usability constraints are: (1) the distribution of data values before and after the watermark should also
remain the same (to be more precise, the probability density function (pdf) of the original data should be preserved, particularly
for high ranking features), (2) the minimum and maximum values of an attribute a should remain the same before and after
watermarking i.e. min(a) = min(aW ) and max(a) = max(aW ), (3) the constraints on the data type of any attribute should not
be violated, for example the number of children should not be changed to floating point, and (4) the class to which an attribute
belongs prior to the watermarking should not be changed after inserting a watermark. The classical optimization techniques
are not suitable because (1) they can get struck in local optima [29], and (2) they cannot solve the problem in realtime in case
of large dimensional problems. It has been an established fact that PSO is better suited for constrained optimization problems
compared with genetic algorithms, Memetic algorithms (MAs), and Ant-colony optimization algorithms ( because of its high
success rate, better solution quality and less processing time [30], [17].
In our implementation of PSO, a particle consists of all βs. Each β is represented by a floating point number that denotes
the percentage change that the value of a feature can tolerate in order to ensure that the usability constraints specified in the
usability constraints matrix ~ are met. As a result, a particle’s size is 32 ∗C, where C is the number of features. The particle
structure is depicted in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The structure of the PSO particle.
η(fc) = βfc ∗ fc (10)
In the proposed scheme, the watermark value is calculated using the optimized β with the help of equation (10). Once the
optimum value of β for each candidate attribute fc is found, the algorithm is stopped.
For brevity, we have only reported the motion of particles to find the optimum value of β – satisfying the constraints (~)
using the fitness function given in equation (9) – in Figure 4 for a candidate feature with the highest classification potential
CP . It is evident from the figure that the particles do converge towards an optimum value of a watermark with the progress of
PSO. Recall that the motivation of our work is to preserve the classification potential (CP ) of high ranking features; therefore,
we plot ∆CP – the difference between CPW and CPO – in Figure 4 to substantiate our argument.
The benefit of using PSO for calculating β prior to watermark insertion is that the process of optimization is not required
during the embedding process. As a result, the watermark can be inserted online in realtime into every tuple of EMR. The
important steps of watermark creation algorithm are shown in Algorithm 1.
To ensure that the classification potential of a feature is not altered once the watermark is inserted, EMR usability constraints
are specified by the set ~. If a particle violates the usability constraints, its velocity is updated is such a way that it quickly
returns to the feasible space. A watermark consisting of l bit strings is generated and the watermark value η is added to the
value of the feature fc when a given bit is 0; otherwise, its value is subtracted from the features’ value. The algorithm stops
when the maximum number of iterations are done or CPO and CPW have approximately equal values for a certain number
of iterations.
9Fig. 4. Motion of particles to find optimum value for watermarking subject to ~.
Algorithm 2 EmbeddingWatermark
Input: EMR, WatermarkW = β1, β2, ..., βC , ~
Output: EMRW , ∆
for q = 1 to C do
for r = 1 to R do
if bi == 0 then
EMRW (r,q) ⇐ EMR(r,q) + η(r,q) subject to ~
end if
insert η(r,q) into ∆
if bi == 1 then
EMRW (r,q) ⇐ EMR(r,q) − η(r,q) subject to ~
end if
insert η(r,q) into ∆
end for
end for
return EMRW ,∆
C. Watermark Embedding
A bit string of length l is generated as the watermark and the best particle from PSO swarm is used to calculate and embed
the watermark value in relevant fields of EMR provided it satisfies the usability constraints set ~. The watermark value η
is calculated using the β values in equation (10). Since the length of the watermark is l; therefore, the watermark value η
is calculated and inserted l times in the EMR. The length l of the watermark should be carefully chosen because: (1) if
it is too small, it makes the watermark vulnerable to attacks, and (2) if it is too large, it results in violating the usability
constraints. Moreover, the watermark should be created in realtime. After a number of empirical studies, a length of 16 bits
is recommended that meets the above-mentioned requirements. (It is important to emphasize that our algorithm allows a user
to chose a watermark length of 8, 16, 32 and 64 bits.)
If the bit is 0 then the value of the selected feature in the matrix f is watermarked by adding η, which is calculated in the
watermark creation step, to its value. If the bit is 1, η is subtracted from the value of the selected feature. We use numeric
attributes to illustrate the watermark embedding procedure. The watermark is created from Step 2 presented in section III-A.
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∆ is a matrix that contains the statistics for each feature fc, such as the percentage change βfc , exact change η, and the overall
change. This matrix is continuously updated during the watermarking embedding process to use it in the decoding stage. The
embedding algorithm is run l times to embed the watermark multiple times keeping in view the usability constraints ~. The
Algorithm 2 lists the steps involved in the watermark embedding stage.
D. Watermark Decoding
In the watermark decoding process, first step is to locate the attributes which have been watermarked. To this end, we again
rank the attributes in EMRW using the procedure given in Section III-A1. We propose a novel watermark decoder τ , which
calculates the amount of change in the value of a feature that does not effect its classification potential. The watermark decoder
decodes the watermark by analyzing one bit at a given time. The decoding phase consists of two steps:
Step 1. For every candidate feature fc of all the rows in EMR
′
W , the watermark bits are detected starting from LSB (least
significant bit) and moving towards MSB (most significant bit). The bits are detected in the reverse order compared with the
bits embedding order because it is easy to detect the effect of last embedded bit of the watermark. This process is carried out
using the change matrix ∆.
Step 2. The bits are then decoded using a majority voting scheme.
E. Watermark Decoder
We now define a novel watermark decoder that takes into account the degree of change, depending on its classification
potential, tolerated by each feature without violating the usability constraints. It is defined as:
τfc =
βfc
γ
, (11)
where γ is the correction factor in the range (0, 1) and is always greater than zero.
We have tested the operator with different values of β and τfc on different EMRs as well. For brevity, we show plot
decoding accuracy of our technique on different combinations of β and τ in Figure 5 for only one selected feature from the
EMRW . The decoding phase of our scheme is dependent on the watermark decoder. The watermark decoder in turn uses
the knowledge of percentage change β introduced during the watermark embedding stage. As a consequence, our watermark
decoder also becomes information-preserving during calculation of β; and hence decoding errors are reduced.
Our decoding algorithm selects one row at a time, for every watermarked feature, and calculates ηdfc using the equation:
ηdfc = βfc ∗ (fcW ), (12)
where ηd(r,fc ) is the detected amount of change in the value of a feature after an attack on the watermark bit b. The algorithm
computes the difference between ηdfc and ηfc using the equation:
η∆fc = ηdfc − ηfc (13)
Where η∆fc represents the difference between the changes detected in the value of a feature during the decoding process
and the changes actually made in its value during the encoding process. This value is compared with the watermark decoder
to correctly decode the bit. If η∆fc for a row r is less than or equal to zero then decoded bit is 1, and if the value of η∆fc for
that row lies between 0 and τ then the decoded bit is 0. Recall, during the watermark creation process the maximum value of
β is calculated subject to the usability constraints ~. Similarly, β is used to compute the optimum value of watermark decoder
τ ; therefore, if for a row r η∆fc is greater than τ then the usability constraints must have been violated for that row r. In this
case, the algorithm decodes the watermark bit as ×. For data to remain useful even after attacks, the number of bits decoded
as × will be very small for the whole dataset. As a result, the majority voting used during the watermark decoding process
cancels the effects of such bits that ensures high watermark decoding accuracy. After decoding a bit, the next bit is detected
using the same process. The watermark decoding steps are depicted in Algorithm 3.
The time complexity of our algorithm is (l ∗ C ∗R) where R is the total number of tuples in the database relation, l is the
watermark length and C is the number of selected subset features from the relation in the database. Since l R , and C  R,
therefore, for large databases the time complexity of encoding and decoding phases of proposed watermarking technique is
O(R). In the following subsection we give an example to highlight the working of our watermark embedding and watermark
decoding algorithms.
F. Example
1) Watermark Encoding: Consider an EMR that has one table with three columns. The third column D1 contains the value
Yes and No indicating if a patient is suffering from the disease D1 or not. Other two columns A1 and A2 contain numeric values
for some vitals of the patient. In order to select the candidate feature for watermarking, we first calculate the classification
potential of the features A1 and A2 using equation (4). After this step, we have identified A1 as the candidate feature for
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Fig. 5. Watermark decoding accuracy for different values of τ .
Algorithm 3 WatermarkDecoding
Input: Altered EMR EMR
′
W , Data Change Matrix ∆, fc, l
Output: Detected Watermark WD
dt(1, 2, ..., l)⇐ 0
Ones⇐ 0
Zeros⇐ 0
for q = 1 to C do
for b = l to 1 do
for r = 1 to R do
Compute ηdq and η∆q using equations (12) and (13) respectively
if η∆q ≤ 0 then
dt(r, b)⇐ 1
Ones = Ones+ 1
else if η∆q > 0 and η∆q ≤ τ then
dt(r, b)⇐ 0
Zeros = Zeros+ 1
else {//usability constraints violated}
dt(r, b)⇐ ×
end if
end for
end for{//Update the data}
if Ones > Zeros then
EMR
′
Wq
= EMR
′
Wq
+ ηd(q)
else
EMR
′
Wq
= EMR
′
Wq
− ηd(q)
end if
end for
WD ⇐ mode(dt(1, 2, ..., l))
return WD
watermarking because A2, having the highest classification potential should not be watermarked. Suppose after applying the
optimization scheme the optimum value of β = 1% is found for watermark embedding. Now suppose we want to insert a
5-bits long watermark ”11001” in the EMR. We calculate the value of η to embed into A1 using the equation:
η = β.A1
Our watermark embedding takes the most significant bit (MSB) of the watermark to embed it into A1. For this purpose the
algorithm works with one row at a time. Now, as the MSB of the watermark is 1, therefore, the new value of A1 (we denote
it by A1W after embedding this bit will be:
A1W = A1 − η
Now, in order to embed second MSB our algorithm again applies the same mechanism, but the updated value of the attribute
A1 (which was A1W ) is used for calculating new values of η and A1W . When our algorithm reaches at third MSB of the
watermark then the new value of A1W after embedding this bit would be:
A1W = A1 + η
The above mechanism is repeated until all rows of the EMR have been watermarked to generate EMRW . In EMRW both
features A1 and A2 have the same classification potential which they had in EMR. The watermarking process is illustrated in
Figure 7.
12
Fig. 6. Watermark encoding process with β = 1% and watermark W = 11001.
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TABLE II
WATERMARK CREATION, INSERTION AND DECODING TIME.
l Creation time Insertion time Decoding time
8-bits 14 Milliseconds 1.5 Milliseconds 0.16 Milliseconds
16-bits 27 Milliseconds 3 Milliseconds 0.26 Milliseconds
32-bits 44 Milliseconds 7.6 Milliseconds 0.38 Milliseconds
64-bits 66 Milliseconds 15 Milliseconds 3 Milliseconds
2) Watermark Decoding: In this phase, the features are again ranked based on their classification potential (calculated using
equation (4)). Now the feature with the least classification potential is A1. So we have identified the watermarked feature.
Now we use the values of β (saved during the watermark encoding stage) to calculate the value of ηD for A1W as follows:
ηD = β.A1W
We decode the embedded bits in reverse order in which they are encoded, that is, we start from the least significant bit (LSB)
and move towards MSB. We use η for embedding the last bit of the watermark and compute its difference from the ηD using
the equation:
η∆ = ηD − η
We compare η∆ with the value of our watermark decoding operator to decode the last embedded watermark bit. After decoding
the last embedded bit for all the rows, majority vote is taken and if the output of the majority voting process for that bit is 1
then 1 is saved as the detected bit and the values of feature A1 in all the rows is updated using the equation:
A1W = A1W + ηD
And if the output of the majority voting is 0 then 0 is saved as the detected bit and the values of feature A1 in all the rows
is updated using the equation:
A1W = A1W − ηD
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the watermark decoding is done in the reverse order of the watermark embedding process:
the last embedded bit is decoded first and so on. Therefore, in this example of watermark decoding (depicted in Figure ??)
the decoded watermark after applying the majority voting scheme on every row of the dataset at every step is 11001, which
is same the embedded watermark.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We have performed extensive experiments to test the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed watermarking technique. We
have applied our technique on two EMRs : (1) an oncology EMR provided for our research by CureMD [http://www.curemd.com]
and (2) a Gynaecological EMR used by the authors of [26]. For brevity, we report results on the second EMR that contains
more than 200,000 electronic health records. The usability constraints specified in equation (9) are imposed during watermark
embedding. We also limit the maximum value of βfc to 2%. We have performed our experiments on a Microsoft SQL Server
that is running on pentium IV computer with 1.73 GHz core 2 CPU with 1 GB of RAM.
It takes approximately 0.003 seconds to embed a 16-bit watermark in one feature of a health record. Similarly, it takes less
than 0.00026 seconds per feature per record to decode it. The watermark encoding takes relatively large time because the
usability constraints must be satisfied for every bit of the watermark in the encoding process. The watermark decoder τ is
computed using equation (11) to minimize the decoding errors. (In the reported results we use p = 100 particles, g=100, and
l=16.)
Recall that we give a choice to the owner of an EMR to chose a watermark length by trading imperceptibility for efficiency.
See in Table II to analyze the time required to insert and detect varying length (8, 16, 32 and 64 bits) watermarks. As a
rule of thumb, we suggest using 16-bit watermark because it provides very good imperceptibility with acceptable processing
overheads.
A. Watermark Imperceptibility and Data Quality
In this section, we show that once the EMR is watermarked with the proposed scheme, the watermark not only remains
imperceptible but also preserves the classification potential of all watermarked features. We use two information theory measures
– Kullback - Leibler Divergence (DKL)4 and Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD)5 to analyze the similarity between features’
4DKL(P ‖ Q) =
∑
i P (i)log
P (i)
Q(i)
.
5JSD(P ‖ Q) = 1
2
D(P ‖M) + 1
2
D(Q ‖M),
where M = 1
2
(P +Q).
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Fig. 7. Watermark Decoding process with β = 1% and τ = 1.
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TABLE III
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN PDFS FOR EMR AND EMRW .
Features MeasureDKL JSD
SYSTOLIC BP 0 0
DIASTOLIC BP 0 0
TEMPERATURE 0.00001 0.000003
OPEN OS SIZE 0.0002 0.00006
distribution of watermarked and original datasets. The results are tabulated in Table III. For brevity, we report the comparison
of pdfs for 2 features from the top and 2 from the bottom of the ranked features, and also plot pdfs for the top ranking feature
from both datasets in Figure 8. We show the information-preserving characteristic of our watermarking by classifying the
watermarked dataset with the classifiers that are used in Section III-A1. (We also add one more rule-based classifier – C4.5 –
to analyze the requirement of preserving diagnosis rules.) We tabulate the classification statistics in Table IV to show effect
of watermarking on them.
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(a) The normal probability density function (pdf) with normal distribution for the attribute
SY STOLIC BP in original data.
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(b) The normal probability density function (pdf) with normal distribution for the attribute
SY STOLIC BPW in the watermarked data.
Fig. 8. The normal data distribution before and after watermarking an attribute SY STOLIC BP in the EMR. It is clear from the figure that the distribution
is preserved when the watermark was embedded.
Remember that the motivation of proposing a information-preserving watermarking scheme is to preserve the diagnosis
of a medical dataset. We have also included the scheme of Shehab [14] in our comparative study. It is obvious from Table
IV that though the scheme of Shehab is imperceptible but it is not information-preserving because it significantly alters the
accuracy of diagnosis. In comparison, our technique has preserved the classification accuracy of different classifiers with the
exception of a classifier – C4.5 – where our scheme has improved FAR by reducing the FP . We believe this is due to the
fact that the proposed scheme considers the correlation present among classification potential of all the candidate attributes for
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TABLE IV
EFFECT OF DIFFERENT WATERMARKING SCHEMES ON VARIOUS CLASSIFICATION STATISTICS.
Classifier Measure EMR EMRWP EMRWS |∆P | |∆S |
Bagging
TP 152 152 124 0 18.52
FP 5 5 5 0 0
TN 3569 3569 3569 0 0
FN 30 30 58 0 92.51
DR(%) 83.52 83.52 68.13 0 18.43
FAR(%) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0
J48
TP 150 151 137 0.75 8.52
FP 3 3 6 0 100
TN 3571 3571 3568 0.01 0.1
FN 32 31 45 2.35 41.22
DR(%) 82.34 82.96 75.33 0.75 8.51
FAR(%) 0.08 0.08 0.17 0 112.5
C4.5
TP 150 151 122 0.67 18.67
FP 3 2 2 33.33 33.33
TN 3571 3571 3572 0.01 0.03
FN 32 33 60 3.13 87.5
DR(%) 82.42 81.87 67.03 0.75 8.51
FAR(%) 0.08 0.06 0.06 25 25
RBF
TP 61 61 64 0 4.96
FP 20 19 11 3.77 45.29
TN 3554 3555 3563 0.02 0.25
FN 121 121 118 0 2.48
DR(%) 33.43 33.43 35.08 0 4.94
FAR(%) 0.56 0.54 0.3 3.57 46.43
NB
TP 125 125 126 0 0.6
FP 183 187 199 2.26 8.83
TN 3391 3387 3375 0.11 0.47
FN 57 57 56 0 1.97
DR(%) 68.72 68.72 69.13 0 0.6
FAR(%) 5.12 5.23 5.57 2.15 8.79
watermarking along with the data usability constraints. In comparison, the technique of Shehab only considers the last three
usability constraints given in equation (9) and does not take into account the classification potential of a candidate attribute
and its correlation with the decision.
B. Preserving Classification Potential of High Ranking Features
Our pilot studies reveal, if an EMR is watermarked without the knowledge of classification potential CP of a feature, the
diagnosis rules are significantly changed; as a consequence, the misdiagnosis increases. This is a serious issue because if a
patient has a disease A and after watermarking of features, the patient is diagnosed for disease B. If the treatment of disease
B is 100 times more expensive, then the patient ends up not only receiving expensive but also incorrect treatment. Therefore,
a watermarking scheme has to be information-preserving to avoid such scenarios.
In Table V, we show the effect of watermarking on classification potential CP . In the table, CP (BW ) is the classification
potential of a particular feature before watermarking and CP (AW ) is the classification potential of that feature after water-
marking. It is obvious from Table V that information-preserving watermarking scheme is able to preserve the classification
potential of a feature after watermarking; as a result, a patient is still diagnosed accurately. In comparison, the threshold based
technique of Shehab alters CP of several features; as a result, the overall classification statistics CS are significantly changed.
Preserving the classification statistics of EMR, which in turn preserves the diagnosis rules, is the most important requirement
that the proposed technique meets. For brevity, we only show a subset of diagnosis rules for hypertension that are discovered by
J48 classifier for the hypertension dataset in Table VI. It is easy to conclude that the diagnosis rules do not change before and
after watermarking using our technique. In contrast, the technique of Shehab alters the classification rules. See the additional
terms appearing in the diagnosis rules of J48 classifier once it is operating on the dataset that is watermarked with Shehab’s
technique. (Remember that the technique of Shehab is not information-preserving because it does not take into account the
impact of high ranking features on the diagnosis.) This further validates our idea of ranking features on the basis of classification
potential before calculating the watermark.
Moreover, it is equally important to demonstrate that a watermarking technique is also resilient to malicious attacks. During
the robustness study, only the proposed technique is evaluated because techniques like Shehab’s do not meet the first requirement
because they do not account for the classification potential of any attribute before watermarking it. Moreover they do not give
any mechanism to decide which attribute is most suitable for watermarking without disturbing the classification potential of
the dataset before and after watermarking. On the other hand, in our technique we first examine the classification potential of
each candidate attribute to be watermarked and then the watermark range for each attribute to be watermarked is calculated
using equations (5) and (6).
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TABLE V
EFFECT OF WATERMARKING OF EMR ON CP s OF VARIOUS FEATURES.
Feature Name CP (BW ) CP (AWP ) CP (AWS) |∆CPP | |∆CPS |
SYSTOLIC BP 17.25 17.25 22.55 0 30.72
DIASTOLIC BP 15.24 15.24 20.28 0 33.07
USD OBSTETRICAL BPD 10.53 10.53 10.91 0 3.61
RANDOM BLOOD SUGAR LEVELS 7.58 7.58 3.92 0 48.28
USD OBSTETRICAL FL 7.43 7.43 8.51 0 14.54
GRAVIDA 6.39 6.39 8.52 0 33.33
AGE 5.4 5.4 1.81 0 66.48
PULSE RATE 4.28 4.28 0.89 0 79.21
HEIGHT 4.1 4.1 0 0 100
PARITYB424MONTHS 3.11 3.11 4.14 0 33.12
RESPIRATORY RATE 2.94 2.94 3.92 0 33.33
WEIGHT 2.88 2.88 1 0 65.28
PARITYAFTER24MONTHS 2.43 2.43 3.23 0 32.92
RENAL FUNCTION UREA 2.09 2.09 1.63 0 22.01
FUNDAL HEIGHT 2.06 2.06 1.72 0 16.5
PULSE 1.34 1.34 1.64 0 22.39
LFT ALT 0.83 0.83 1.1 0 32.53
MENARCHE 0.74 0.74 0.99 0 33.78
TLC 0.63 0.63 0.89 0 41.27
RENAL FUNCTION CREATININE 0.6 0.6 0.8 0 33.33
STATION 0.6 0.6 0.79 0 31.67
PLATELET COUNT 0.4 0.4 0 0 100
CF FUNDAL HEIGHT 0.38 0.38 0 0 100
APPROX FETAL WEIGHT 0.27 0.27 0.36 0 33.33
TEMPERATURE 0.22 0.22 0 0 100
OPEN OS SIZE 0.2 0.2 0.26 0 30
TABLE VI
EFFECT OF DIFFERENT WATERMARKING TECHNIQUES ON CLASSIFICATION RULES.
EMR EMRWP EMRWS
If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 122 And GRAVIDA <= 1
And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And
STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5 And STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5 And STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5
And DIASTOLIC BP <= 70 Then And DIASTOLIC BP <= 70 Then And HEIGHT > 160.5 Then
Hypertension = Yes Hypertension = Yes Hypertension = Yes
If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 122 And GRAVIDA <= 1
And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And And APPROX FETAL WEIGHT > 1.5 And
STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5 And STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5 And STATION > 0 And OPEN OS SIZE <=3.5
And DIASTOLIC BP > 70 Then And DIASTOLIC BP > 70 Then And HEIGHT <= 160.5 Then
Hypertension = No Hypertension = No Hypertension = No
If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 120 And GRAVIDA <= 1 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 122 And GRAVIDA <= 1
And PULSE RATE > 76 Then And PULSE RATE > 76 Then And PULSE RATE <= 76 And PULSE RATE > 74
Hypertension = No Hypertension = No And AGE > 26 And AGE <= 32 Then
Hypertension = No
If SYSTOLIC BP <= 160 And SYSTOLIC BP > 120 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 160 And SYSTOLIC BP > 120 If SYSTOLIC BP <= 162 And SYSTOLIC BP > 122
And HEIGHT > 160.5 And STATION > 2 And And HEIGHT > 160.5 STATION > 2 And And HEIGHT > 160.5 And STATION > 2 And
PULSE RATE > 87 Then PULSE RATE > 87 Then HAEMOGLOBIN LEVELS <= 8 Then
Hypertension = Yes Hypertension = Yes Hypertension = Yes
C. Resilience to Various Attacks
In this study, different types of attacks are generated on the watermarked data. A watermarking technique must meet two
requirements: (1) an intruder is not able to locate the watermark, and (2) an intruder is not able to corrupt the watermark
without significantly degrading the quality of data.
Suppose Alice is the owner of an EMR and she embeds a watermark W in the electronic records; as a result, the watermarked
EMR is EMRW . Alice now wants to share EMRW with Bob. In the meantime, Mallory (an intruder) wants to remove the
watermark from the dataset so that Alice is unable to claim ownership of its EMR in a court of law.
The robustness study is conducted with the following assumptions: (1) Mallory does not have access to the original EMR,
and (2) Mallory does not have the resources to acquire secret information like candidate subset fc data of EMR, overall
data change ∆, usability constraints ~, change in a particular feature βfc , watermark length l, and the watermark decoder τfc .
These assumptions (though realistic) make the task of Mallory relatively difficult because he has to corrupt the watermark
without compromising the usability of the medical data. Mallory may calculate the classification potential of features in the
watermarked dataset but he has to face a dilemma of preserving the diagnostic rules of the dataset while trying to corrupt the
watermark.
Therefore, in a worst case scenario, if he is able to successfully alter the watermarked feature while preserving usability
constraints (which he is not aware of), even then our technique is able to successfully extract the watermark because we insert
the watermark in each row of the database and an attack on a set of rows does not significantly affect the decoding process
to a great extent. Also, to deceive the attacker, apart from low ranking features, we select some high ranking (except top t
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features with respect to classification potential, where t can be decided by the data owner) features for watermarking with
classification potential within a certain threshold such that watermarking them does not alter the classification potential of any
feature. And we have used the majority voting scheme that significantly reduces the probability of incorrect decoding on the
basis of attacking few rows only. Since the attacker has no knowledge of original data and the embedded watermark, therefore,
to corrupt the watermark – he may make random changes in the watermark dataset. So for him, at every trial, the probability
of success (p) is 0.5 for successfully deleting one watermark bit from one row of the watermarked dataset. But we embed
watermark in each row of the dataset and take majority voting while decoding the embedded watermark bit, so attacker has to
successfully attack at least half the total number of rows R in the dataset. And attack on one row is independent of the attack
on other rows, so according to the multiplication rule of the probability, the probability of successfully attacking R2 rows is
(0.5)
R
2 . But practically speaking, EMRs have large number of health records and for such EMRs the probability of successful
attack even on a single watermark bit is approximately zero.
successfully attacking a watermark bit is virtually zero.
Therefore, the knowledge of classification potentials of the features will not be useful for him to corrupt the watermark
unless he deteriorates the data by violating the usability constraints. This model is validated by the experimental results, that
proves resilience of our technique against all types of malicious attacks.
In the robustness study, three attacks are studied: (1) Insertion, (2) Deletion, and (3) Alteration.
D. Insertion Attacks
Since we embed watermark in each row, and we do not target the order of tuples during watermark embedding; therefore,
insertion of new tuples does not disturb the embedded watermark. In the decoding stage, to achieve high detecting accuracy
we take the majority voting over all the rows for detecting the embedded watermark. Moreover, we do not use any marker
tuples for watermark embedding hence inserting new rows does not make our scheme vulnerable to synchronization errors
(which might occur if insertion of new records perturbs the order of marker tuples.) For insertion attacks, Mallory can utilize
two mechanisms to insert new tuples into EMR. He might insert α new records by replicating the original records. In this way,
α-duplicate records are inserted into EMR. It is clear from Figure 9 that the proposed technique is resilient to α-duplicate
insertion attack because it does not target any specific tuple(s) for watermark embedding.
Fig. 9. Resilience of proposed technique against various insertion attacks. (a) Resilience to α-duplicate insertion attacks. (b) Resilience to (α, %) insertion
attacks.
The second possibility is to randomly generate fake records and insert them into the EMR. Since Mallory has no information
about the original EMR; therefore, he will generate useless records. He may insert new records with the values within the
range (µW ± %σW ) for a specific feature. This type of attack is called (α, %)- insertion attacks. It is obvious from Figure 9
that the proposed technique is resilient (generally speaking) to (α, %)- insertion attacks and we believe this is because it does
not target any specific tuple to insert the watermark.
E. Deletion Attacks
In this attack, Mallory deletes selected α tuples from the watermarked dataset EMRW . It is the task of the decoding
algorithm to recover the watermark from the remaining tuples in each partition. Mallory has to preserve the usability of the
dataset, so we assume that deleting tuples does not violate the usability constraints. In particular, if deleting α tuples changes
the classification potential of the feature(s) present in the EMR to an extent where overall rank of the features is changed
then the diagnosis rules will also change; as a result, the data will not be useful anymore for data mining. Since Mallory
is unaware of other usability constraints; therefore, to launch an attack the only option for him is to delete α tuples such
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that the rank of the features remain intact after the attack. As a consequence, the data remains useful for knowledge driven
CDSSs which directly depend on the rank of the features. So, we can realistically assume that Mallory may not be able to
alter the ranks of the features while deleting features. Therefore, our technique is able to correctly decode the watermark as
long as the features’ ranks are not disturbed. In Figure 10, one can see that even when 80% tuples are deleted, the proposed
scheme is able to recover watermark with 100% accuracy. Similarly, when 95% of tuples are deleted, the scheme is still able
to recover watermark with an accuracy of 93%. The reason is the same that it does not use marker tuples and also does not
insert watermark into specific tuple(s).
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Fig. 10. Resilience to deletion attacks.
.
F. Alteration Attacks
Mallory can alter the value of an attribute by changing the value of an attribute in a random or fixed manner. In case of
random alterations, Mallory selects α tuples and changes the values of features in the range [0,±%]; hence they are termed
as (α, % ) alteration attacks. One can see in Figure 11 that the proposed technique successfully retrieves the watermark even
when 60% records are altered. The watermark decoder caters for such data alterations and hence provides robustness against
such alterations.
In the second case, Mallory selects α tuples and alters the value of a feature from x to (x±%). But we see in Figure 11 that
the proposed technique is resilient to such fixed alteration attacks as well. This is because the decoding process uses watermark
decoder that uses information-preserving watermarking parameter β.
Fig. 11. Resilience to alteration attacks. (a) Resilience to random (α, %)-alteration attacks. (b) Resilience to fixed (α, %)-alteration attacks.
A sophisticated attacker may try to simultaneously launch deletion, insertion, and alteration attacks. In this case, the
probability of successful attack is (o.5)
(α+ω)
2 , where α is the number of records altered, and ω is the number of unaltered
records selected from the watermarked dataset. We have also conducted a number of experiments by changing the percentage
of records added, deleted and altered. Our findings are that if an attacker deletes up to 40% (of R) of records, adds up to
50%(of R) new records, and alters up to 40%(of R) records, we are still able to recover the watermark with 100% accuracy.
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TABLE VII
CORRELATION AMONG WATERMARKS.
l Proposed Scheme Shehab’s Scheme Probabilistic Decoding
8 bits 1 0.16 -0.07
16 bits 1 0.13 -0.22
32 bits 1 0.12 -0.06
64 bits 1 -0.23 0.1
Moreover, we also study the imperceptibility of the proposed watermarking technique. The objective of this study is to analyze
the correlation between the inserted watermark – using our information-preserving watermarking scheme – and the recovered
(decoded) watermark using different decoding schemes. The study proves that a watermark inserted with our technique could
be successfully decoded using our decoding scheme only. For this purpose, correlation coefficient [31] is used. The results
tabulated in Table VII are the average values of correlation coefficient obtained from 100 different runs of each algorithm. It is
clear that the proposed technique achieves the best correlation coefficient through different runs of the algorithms. Any other
watermark decoding techniqe never achieves more than 0.16 correlation coefficient.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel information-preserving technique for watermarking EMR is presented. The benefits of this technique
are: (1) preserving the classification potential of high ranking features, (2) empirically selecting the length of watermark to
ensure realtime computability constraints, (3) ensuring the usability constraints, and (4) decoding the watermark using majority
voting based on a novel watermark decoder. The benefit of using watermark decoder is that it makes the technique resilient
to malicious attacks, even in presence of violations of few usability constraints. We have compared the proposed technique
with a recently proposed state-of-the-art technique to show that the technique preserves the diagnostic rules of medical data;
as a result, the misdiagnosis rate is significantly reduced. To the best of our knowledge, no watermarking technique utilizes
the information of classification potential. Moreover, the technique is also resilient to insertion, deletion and alteration attacks.
In future, we would like to extend the technique on non-numeric strings data and medical images.
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